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PROBLEMS IN PUBLIC MANAGEMENT DEVELOPMENT IN 
ASIA1 
Clay Goodloe Wescott 
Introduction 
Is it possible to measure the quality of overall governance in a developing Asian 
country? Are present measures robust enough to allow the ranking of countries along a 
continuum from well-governed to poorly-governed? Should these rankings be used by 
donor agencies and private investors in making investment decisions? Despite the 
complexity and diversity of approaches of governance systems, there are various 
qualitative and quantitative tools being used in the region. In this article, the advantages 
and disadvantages of some of these tools will be analyzed, and some lessons will be 
derived showing how the prudent use of governance indicators can help development 
agencies and private investors.  
Until a few years ago, the Asian Development Bank (ADB) had not paid enough 
attention to governance issues, in part because information is highly subjective and 
difficult to come by. Also, in comparison to economic issues, governance is more 
culturally-specific, with greater cross-country differences.  
Another objection to taking governance issues into consideration came from Article 36 
of the Bank’s Charter, which states that the Bank, “…shall not interfere in the political 
affairs of any member nor shall they be influenced in their decisions by the political 
character of the member concerned. Only economic considerations shall be relevant to 
their decisions…” 
The term "economic considerations," however, has been widely interpreted by the Bank. 
Data from recent studies are showing that governance matters for economic 
development. For example, a survey of governance in around 165 countries found that a 
one standard deviation increase in any one of 6 governance indicators causes a 2 ½ fold 
increase in PC income, a 4 fold decrease in infant mortality, and a 15 to 25 percent 
increase in literacy.2 A one standard deviation increase would be moving from rule of 
law in Russia to the Czech Republic, or moving in reducing corruption from levels in 
Indonesia to levels in Korea. This research indicates a causal link between improved 
governance and improved development performance. Easterly and Levine (1997) 
compare development performance in Asia and Africa, and find the latter suffered 
because ethnic conflict encouraged policies fostering rent-seeking rather than economic 
performance. Van Rijckeghem and Weder (1997) use regression analysis to show that 
countries with poorly paid public officials tend towards higher corruption. 
The link is strongest for the extremes: the worst performers have the worst governance, 
and the best, the best. The link is harder to prove when comparing countries closer in 
rank order. For example, China’s economic performance has recently been stronger than 
India’s; yet India has a highly developed (though out of date) legal system and many 
lawyers, while China’s legal system is, by comparison, rudimentary. As Dethier (1999) 
points out, the reason may be that there are informal substitutes for the legal protection 
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and enforcement of property rights which existed long before states and formal legal 
institutions (e.g. arbitration, reputation, merger, strong-arm tactics, and altruism), 
highlighting one of the problems of specifying governance indicators.  
In addition, there are a host of problems with data, model specification, and statistical 
estimation that make any analysis of causal links between governance and development 
performance exceptionally difficult. Take, for example, the case of a posited link 
between poor civil service pay and corruption, cited above. Broader comparative 
research indicates that there is a high correlation between the various governance 
indicators in most data sets. Thus, a significant regression finding between two 
variables may be “caused” by one or more other factors not being measured. This article 
will not go further into such questions, but rather focus on the task of measuring the 
quality of governance for its own sake. 
Based on the presumption that effective governance is needed for strong development 
performance, the Bank adopted a policy, Governance: Sound Development 
Management, in August 1995, and an anti-corruption policy in 1998. In addition, by 
launching a governance website in 1999,3 and hiring a core group of specialist staff, the 
Bank has moved proactively to address a broad range of governance issues. 
The Bank defines governance as, "…the manner in which power is exercised in the 
management of a country's social and economic resources for development." ADB’s 
emphasis in its governance programming is on dialogue and local ownership. Every 
effort is made to ensure that governance programs and conditions are: 
a. based on knowledge of the realities in practice rather than on blueprints and 
preconceptions; 
b. based on genuine dialog rather than just pressure; 
c. implemented forcefully but with a realistic sequence and timetable 
d. designed taking into account the constraints of country capacity to carry them 
through; 
e. flexible enough so that executing agencies can develop individual sub-projects 
within programs as and when progress permits; 
f. funded by a higher proportion of grant-funded technical assistance to lending 
than would be the case for other types of programs. 
A central governance challenge is that while the Bank’s overarching objective is to 
reduce poverty in developing member countries (DMCs), many DMC governments are 
essentially non-democratic. Olson (2000) argues that under autocratic systems, ruling 
elites block reforms that would disrupt the status quo that allows them to plunder their 
citizens. Yet Olson acknowledges that the same elites have an "encompassing interest" 
in the domain they are exploiting: if it prospers, they can extract more for themselves in 
taxes and other way. And Dollar and Kraay (2000) show the surest way to reduce 
poverty is economic growth. So there is some reason for hope. 
Another way of looking at the challenge is that one might expect even autocratic 
governments to redistribute some minimum amount in order to ensure that some of the 
most visible manifestations of poverty are reduced. This would reduce adverse publicity 
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(e.g., bad for business and tourism), and reduce the threat of socio-political instability. 
However, it is not easy to persuade these governments to transfer large amounts of 
public resources to poor and weak segments of society that have little political leverage, 
or to work for pro-poor, sustainable economic growth. 
Reasons for Measuring Governance 
Over the last decade, there has been an increasing interest in measuring governance 
across nations by investors, donor agencies, and academics. Deleon and Resnick-Terry 
(1999) explain how earlier efforts by academics such as Binder et. al. (1971) went out 
of favor in the 1980s as analysts focused on differences in context, and the difficulties 
these cause in making comparisons. However, over the last decade, measuring 
governance has come back into favor through a combination of advances in information 
and communications technology (thus facilitating cross-national data-gathering and 
research) and advances in public choice theory and institutional economics. The 
increasing impetus for performance appraisal and efficiency has led to the international 
search for good practices or “policy pinching”, and the inevitable comparative 
measurement to see if what worked in country "X" works as well in country "Y".  
Donor agencies and other investors want comparative governance measurements to help 
in making sound investment decisions. In the past, agencies allocated official 
development assistance based mainly on per capita income and population. Poor 
countries tended to get more aid per capita than better off ones, and small countries 
more than larger ones - both to compensate them for increased risks, and because the 
cost of running an aid program in a country dictates a minimum expenditure level, 
leading to the highest aid allocations per capita in some of the smallest countries. 
Countries that benefited from aid under these allocation formulae were often not well 
governed. As official development assistance declines, and is replaced by investment 
from private investors, pension funds, and the like, development financing is likely to 
be more and more attracted to countries with favorable governance indicators,4 thus 
shifting resources in many cases to a different set of countries.  
International agencies also want to find out if governments are abiding by international 
conventions and treaties they have signed. UNDP (1991) used the Humana Index, for 
example, taking account of 40 different dimensions of human rights and then scored 
each country for compliance or non-compliance. The International Parliamentary Union 
(2000) ranks countries based on the percentage of women in national legislatures. There 
are also mechanisms for monitoring countries’ periodic reports on the Universal 
Declaration on Human Rights and related conventions5 outlining legislative, judicial, 
administrative and other requirements. NGOs such as Freedom House (1999) and 
Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (1997) monitor comparative progress 
and setbacks in governance. The Political and Economic Risk Consultancy (1998) rates 
eleven Asian countries based on perceptions on the quality of media. Governments 
themselves also measure the governance of their neighbors to assess security risks.6 
Methodological Problems with Measuring Governance 
Governance can be measured in terms of effort or in terms of results.7 The former is 
important for morale, and also fairness when international concessional fund allocations 
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are made. A small step forward in a country with weak governance may be more 
difficult to achieve than a larger step forward in a better governed country; The former 
deserves some credit for its achievements, however meager in comparative terms.  
Yet measures of effort need to be combined with measures of tangible progress towards 
objectives. There are four types of results: in terms of inputs, outputs, outcomes 
(including impacts), and process. When results measurement is cost effective and 
appropriate, one should use whatever combination of indicators that is suitable for the 
activity, sector, country, and time being measured. Choosing the right combination 
raises many methodological issues and tradeoffs. For example, there is the common 
problem that “what you see is not always what you get.” Laws and regulations enacted 
may not be enforced. Anti-corruption units may focus on eliminating political 
opponents. Policymakers may ventriloquize commitment to donor-supported policy 
changes, giving the impression of local ownership of reforms; yet their actual views 
may be directly opposite. Expatriate advisors may be used not to train counterparts, but 
to carry out policy formulation and coordination roles, thus sidelining counterparts, who 
are seen by insecure rulers as potential threats if they know too much. Staff given 
specialized training may be transferred to assignments where the training is irrelevant 
for the same reason, thus perpetuating problems of low government effectiveness. Thus, 
one needs to be careful what one measures, and what inferences are drawn.  
Another issue is who does the measuring, and on what authority. A central goal of 
measuring governance in developing Asia is to encourage countries to improve through 
a combination of external and internal incentives. External incentives include increased 
aid allocations and investment, and improved standings in international organizations. 
Yet many of the measurements used are designed and implemented by external 
evaluators, and are thus subject to the criticism that they are not sensitive to local 
contexts, and not locally owned. The Development Assistance Committee of OECD 
(1998, 1999) is developing methodologies for measuring governance jointly with 
partner countries in an effort to support country-based processes and improve local 
ownership. 
Examples of Measuring Governance in Practice 
Qualitative Reporting 
Qualitative reporting can give richness and depth of analysis. It is particularly suitable 
for measuring outcome and process variables, and may be based on international 
standards. Such reporting typically analyzes each case separately, may include 
comparative, quantitative indicators as part of the analysis, and may also rank cases 
based on the quality of the governance aspects examined. Here are some examples: 
Governance issues studies 
International donor agencies carry out these studies to better understand how 
governance affects their assistance, and to get pointers on how the assistance can better 
help improve governance in each developing member country (DMC). Since the ADB 
governance policy was approved, governance issues have been analyzed in separate 
sections of Country Assistance Plans and Country Operational Strategy Studies. In 
addition, the Bank is selectively carrying out separate governance issues studies in 
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developing member countries, which then become the basis for detailed governance 
strategies for the countries. Studies for Thailand and Cambodia are completed.8 Other 
studies are underway in China, Lao PDR, Nepal, Pakistan (a governance issues study 
team was working in Pakistan during the October 1999 coup), Bangladesh and Vietnam. 
In addition, the ADB (1999) has completed a major, comparative review of public 
sector reform in 6 Pacific island countries. The World Bank is carrying out comparable 
“National Institutional Reviews” in selected countries.  
These studies pay particular attention to the extent of transparency in budget 
preparation, level and trend of non-productive government expenditures and spending 
on social sector programs, degree of participation in development processes (at national, 
sector, and project levels), success in fighting corruption, prevalence of legal and 
bureaucratic factors promoting official secrecy and inhibiting public access to 
information, and the need to ensure that complex, large, and unusual patterns of 
financial transactions are monitored and reported. Based on this analysis, the Bank 
works with developing member countries to formulate strategies and programs to 
address the key governance issues identified, together with relevant performance 
indicators.  
By tailoring work to each country’s specific conditions, they avoid some of the 
methodological problems discussed earlier. For example, some of them, such as the 
Cambodia study, have been highly participatory, thus building local ownership for 
future reforms. They avoid mistaking form for content by going beyond quantitative 
ratings, and allowing for analysis of distinctive features of country context. They 
provide a reality check for interpreting standard indicators of overall governance across 
countries. The disadvantage of these studies is that they can be selective, may be biased 
by the self-interests of informants, and do not have built in systems for resolving 
conflicting informant views. 
Reporting on fiscal transparency  
The “Code of Good Practices on Fiscal Transparency” was adopted by the Board of the 
IMF. (1998) The Code includes, “Requirements for a minimum standard of fiscal 
transparency.” This minimum standard is far below the standard found in developed 
countries, but judged to be the minimum necessary for effective functioning of a 
government. There are four broad requirements covered: clarity of roles and 
responsibilities, public availability of information, open budget preparation, execution 
and reporting, and independent assurances of integrity. This minimum standard has 
provided a useful basis for both self-diagnosis by countries themselves, and reporting by 
international donors. For example, it was used as the basis for country reports by 10 
Pacific Island Countries facilitated by the IMF and UNDP in 1998, and as the basis for 
part of the ADB Governance Issues Study for Lao PDR in 1999. 
As with some of the Governance Issues Studies, country self-diagnoses can build 
ownership for ensuing reforms. Based on a standardized questionnaire, they also 
provide data in a format whereby countries can be compared to each other. Although 
this reporting looks only at limited aspects of governance, it focuses attention on a 
reform agenda that can have many positive linkages to other aspects of governance. 
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Innovation awards program  
This provides an explicitly competitive opportunity for reporting on governance. The 
theme of the CAPAM (the Commonwealth Association of Public Administration and 
Management) International Innovations Awards Program in 1998, was "Service To The 
Public." CAPAM received 121 submissions to the Program from 24 countries 
worldwide. The Awards Program was co-sponsored by CAPAM, KPMG, and 
Binariang, a telecommunications company in Malaysia. 
Winners and summary descriptions from CAPAM (1998) included:  
1. Education Guarantee Scheme, Rajiv Gandhi Shiksha Mission, State of 
Madhya Pradesh (India)-- In one year over 16,089 schools were built, or 40 
new schools per day. Nearly 500,000 children were served. 
2. Ontario Delivers - Improving the Delivery of Quality Public Service in 
Ontario (Canada)-- Electronic service delivery was adopted, including a 
"One-Window" approach, leading to faster service and greater ease of 
transactions. 
3. New Pension Delivery Systems (South Africa)-- The Department of Social 
Welfare, Free State has cut down time to process applications from three 
months to as little as two weeks, and serves citizens 7 days a week. Results 
also include less fraud, less need for long travel to pay points, and better 
security at pay points.  
A subsequent competition is being carried out over the period 1999-2000. This type of 
reporting is highly participatory, helps to raise the stature of governance reformers, and 
is a good means of sharing ideas that may be picked up in other countries. The 
disadvantage is that successful innovations say nothing about the overall governance 
environment, and are often dependent on exceptional individuals and contextual factors 
that can’t be easily replicated. 
Quantitative Reporting 
In addition to qualitative reporting, quantitative indicators can give numerical precision 
(although often not as precise as they seem on the surface). In some cases, these tools 
can allow cross-country comparisons. Kauffman et. al. (1999) combines many 
performance indicators into six broad clusters, allowing statistical analysis of the 
relation between governance and economic performance across a range of countries.  
Dethier (1999) points out that most governance variables are proxies, whether 
qualitative (e.g. perception of corruption) or quantitative, e.g., percentage of total 
procurement subject to open, competitive bidding. In the case of the former, subjective 
values are typically ranked on an ordinal scale. The use of proxies runs a high risk of 
measurement errors and biased estimates. There is also a common problem that some 
explanatory variables used in studies are poor proxies for describing actual legal and 
political processes. A good proxy indicator should be relevant, and permit regular 
observation and "reasonably objective" interpretation to determine the change in its 
value or status. 
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Each aspect of governance can be measured in different ways, for different purposes. In 
the case of corruption, for instance, one can measure the public or experts’ perception of 
corruption, or experiences of corruption, e.g., frequency of bribery in procurement 
contracts, amount of bribes as a percentage of contract value, frequency of bribery in 
permit applications, percentage of public sector jobs bought, percentage of public 
servants income as bribes. Alternatively, one may use costs of public services, costs of 
construction, assets of leaders, etc. as more indirect (but "harder") proxies of corruption, 
poor governance and wastage. A good measurement of corruption can present hard data 
and generate public debate on the issue of corruption. But corruption is only a symptom 
of underlying weaknesses in governance. Thus complementary diagnostic (either 
qualitative or quantitative surveys on governance can potentially identify the underlying 
causes of corruption. For example, whether a public institution bases its hiring and 
promotion decisions on meritocracy or favoritism and whether there are auditing and 
oversight mechanisms in budget allocation may explain the extent of corruption in the 
institution. Dethier (1999) points out that diagnostic surveys can also depoliticize the 
discussion of corruption by shifting public attention from people to institutions.  
Here are some examples of uses of quantitative indicators: 
Democracy and governance program indicators  
Developed by the Center for Democracy and Governance (1998), US Agency for 
International Development to measure country and program performance, they are 
organized under four governance objectives: strengthened rule of law and respect for 
human rights, more genuine and competitive political processes, increased development 
of a politically active civil society, and more transparent and accountable governance 
institutions. Indicators are organized under program “objective” and “intermediate 
results” being measured. Among the hundreds of indicators listed, one example is: 
“Judicial salary and benefits as a % of what a comparable professional makes in private 
practice.” This comes under the first objective, and the intermediate result: “Effective 
and fair legal institutions." A suggested guideline is that compensation should ideally be 
80-90% of that in private practice. Compensation significantly less than that is a 
warning flag for rule of law. As with all the indicators, there is an estimate of the cost of 
obtaining the needed data: in this case, “low” (less then $500).  
This approach stresses the need for cost-effective indicators and tradeoffs. For example, 
to determine the intermediate result: “improved application of the law in commercial 
cases”, one could conduct an expert review of sample cases to see if the law had been 
appropriately applied. A lower-cost proxy indicator would measure “percentage change 
in the number of commercial cases filed.” The use of this proxy would assume that 
citizens are more willing to file cases if they think the law will be predictably and fairly 
applied. 
This approach also stresses that indicators be operational: “number of public defenders 
per 100,000 population,” or “percent change in number of cases handled by public 
defenders,” rather than “availability of legal services.” Indicators should show the size 
of the problem when possible: “percent of human rights violations reported 
investigated/prosecuted” rather than “number of human rights violations reported 
investigated/prosecuted.” Indicators should measure incremental changes where 
possible, not just the attainment of thresholds: “percent of civil society organizations 
showing improvement on an index,” rather than “percent of civil society organizations 
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that have a written strategic plan.” Indicators should also measure the intended result as 
directly as possible: “percent of citizens understanding basic human rights” rather than 
“numbers reached by civic education.”  
USAID developed these indicators to monitor progress in achieving planned results. 
They were initially tested in four countries with different governance systems, data 
availability, and data collection expertise. There was no explicit intention to use the 
indicators to compare governance progress in these or other countries, but rather an 
effort to come up with a set of indicators robust enough to be suitable for a range of 
country contexts.  
Performance allocation rating  
The World Bank International Development Association system is based on a country 
policy and institutional assessment (CPIA) (80%) and a portfolio performance review 
(20%). The former is based on ratings on a scale of 1 – 6 of 20 criteria under 4 clusters: 
economic management, structural policies, policies for reducing inequalities, and public 
sector management/institutions. Countries whose performance is rated “unsatisfactory” 
on the governance criteria – criteria from the CPIA and the procurement criterion of the 
portfolio performance component, are put on a governance watch list. Countries 
receiving “highly unsatisfactory” ratings on governance criteria have their overall rating 
cut by a third, called the “governance discount”. A country’s allocation of concessional 
financing is then calculated through a formula taking into account per capita GNP and 
the performance rating. The governance criteria of the CPIA are: property rights and 
rule-based governance, quality of budgetary and financial management, efficiency of 
resource mobilization, efficiency of public expenditure, and transparency and 
accountability, and corruption in the public sector.9 
Despite the methodological problems indicated earlier in making cross-country 
comparisons based on governance indicators, the ADB is currently designing a system 
to measure overall governance in developing member countries. Unlike the World 
Bank, the ADB governance ratings are not planned to be used currently as part of a 
formula for determining overall lending allocations, but rather as a guide for policy 
dialog and program planning. The ADB objective is to stimulate discussion with 
countries on how governance indicators are moving and why. The approach will be to 
work in partnership with countries to solve mutually-acknowledged problems. 
Moody's (2000) country risk guidelines  
These are used as the basis for "sovereign ratings" of a country's creditworthiness, 
taking into account answers to, inter alia, the following questions:  
1. Is there a substantial risk of political regime change which could lead to a 
general repudiation of debts--or a risk of civil war/anarchy or foreign 
invasion?  
2. Does the country have a well-established system of contract law, which allows 
for successful suits for collection of unpaid debts, seizure of collateral, 
technical breakdowns?  
3. Does the country have a deep financial system which is effective in making 
payments and avoiding technical breakdowns?  
4. Is the regulatory/legal environment malleable, corrupt, unpredictable, etc.?  
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5. Is there a tendency towards hyperinflation? (Moody's, 2000) 
The resulting analysis leads to investment ratings for short- and long-term debt. Some 
examples of current sovereign rankings in the region for long-term debt include both 
Investment-Grade (Singapore-Aaa, People’s Republic of China – A3, Hong Kong A3, 
Rep. of Korea-Baa2, Malaysia-Baa3,), and Speculative-Grade (Fiji-Ba1, Philippines-
Ba1, Thailand- Ba1, India-Ba2, Papua New Guinea-B1, Indonesia-B3, Pakistan Caa1). 
Similar to other ratings systems such as PRS Group (2000), S&P (2000), and Simon 
(1992), this one measures aspects of governance of particular interest to certain types of 
investors. There is no attempt to build country ownership in the system: indeed the 
independence of the system from country manipulation is a prime attraction to clients. 
Instead, countries are encouraged to improve on the indicators being measured, so that 
they can reduce interest charges and attract more investors.  
Transparency International (TI) corruption and bribe payers perception indices  
This international NGO released its fifth annual Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) in 
1999, ranking 99 countries based on a compilation of 17 surveys from 10 independent 
organisations. TI (1999) also released for the first time a Bribe Payers Perceptions Index 
(BPI). This ranks 19 leading exporting countries in terms of the degree to which their 
corporations are perceived to be paying bribes abroad. The BPI shows that companies 
from many leading exporting nations are widely seen as using bribes to win business. 
The BPI reveals that on a scale of 0 – 10, where 10 represents a corrupt-free exporting 
country, the best score among the countries rated was 8.3, while the worst score, 
representing a great propensity to use bribes, was 3.1. China (including Hong Kong) 
was seen as having the greatest willingness to pay bribes abroad, followed by South 
Korea, Taiwan, Italy and Malaysia. Sweden, Australia and Canada achieved the most 
favorable results.  
These indices are valuable for generating publicity, leading to pressure from citizens on 
businesses and governments to reduce corruption. However, as in most quantitative 
governance indices, the degree of numerical precision should not be overstated. The 
comparative data surveys on which the indices are built draw from the experience and 
perceptions of those most directly confronted with the realities of corruption, e.g. 
business people, country experts, chambers of commerce etc. As such, they may reflect 
biases stemming from different country contexts. For example, Nigeria may be ranked 
more corrupt than China because the former has a much more open press than the latter, 
with extensive reporting on alleged corruption reinforcing the impression of its scale. 
While the actual level of corruption in China could be similar, the perception might be 
that it was lower because it is not as openly reported on or discussed. 
One could try to measure corruption in other ways: say by comparing the number of 
prosecutions or court cases. Yet such cross-country data might again not reflect actual 
levels of corruption, but rather the quality of prosecutors, courts or the media in 
exposing corruption. 
Lessons from Work in Progress on Measuring Governance 
There is increasing interest in measuring governance in developing Asia among 
development agencies, private investors, citizens, and governments. Despite the 
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complexity and diversity of approaches of governance systems, there are various 
qualitative and quantitative tools being used in the region, developed thanks to advances 
in theory and in information and communications technologies making comparative 
work of this type more feasible and intellectually coherent. The examples discussed 
here have been selected to highlight some lessons for work in progress. References to 
other work are included, but given the fast-moving nature of the field, this list is bound 
to be incomplete. 
The first lesson from this work in progress is that the measurement of governance 
performance over time in a single country is conceptually more straightforward than 
measuring performance across countries. The USAID indicators discussed have been 
designed for the former purpose, and would seem to provide a useful toolkit for a wide 
range of different country contexts. The ADB and World Bank Governance Issues 
Studies are another example, adding qualitative richness to the task of measuring 
governance in Asian countries. By focusing on individual countries, they avoid 
problems of how to make meaningful comparisons between countries in widely 
different situations.  
A second lesson is that cross-country comparisons that group countries into broad 
clusters are more meaningful than comparisons which rank-order countries. Moody’s 
“investment grade” rating is an example of a broad cluster grouping. The IMF minimum 
standard on fiscal transparency can also be useful in separating countries that meet the 
standard from those that do not.  
The most useful indicators are clear, relevant, economic, adequate, and monitorable. 




                                                 
1 Views expressed are personal perspectives of the author and may not reflect those of 
the institution with which he is affiliated. 
2 The indicators measure the process by which governments are selected, monitored and 
replaced, the capacity of the government to effectively formulate and carry out effective 
policies, and the respect of citizens and the state for laws, regulations and other 
institutions that govern the economic and social interactions among them. Cf. 
Kaufmann e.t al. (1999). 
3 See < http://www.adb.org/Work/Governance/>. The “links” page lists many other 
websites covering governance issues. 
4 This issue has been explored extensively by the Money Matters Institute, at 
<www.worldpaper.org> 
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5 They are: Convention Against Torture; Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination; Convention on the Rights of the Child; International Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination; International Convention on the 
Protection of the Rights of All Migrants; International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights; International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. 
6 A major research effort within the US government (National Research Council, White 
House, et al) in the mid-90s tried to establish indicators that would predict the risk of 
state failure. However, the results were never released because of fears of diplomatic 
problems (and possibly self-fulfilling prophecies) with the high-risk countries. 
7 The section draws from, inter alia, Schiavo-Campo and Sundaram, forthcoming. 
8 http://www.adb.org/Work/Governance/thailand.pdf; Kato et al (2000). 
9 Other tools in use by the World Bank include, inter alia, Program Expenditure Reform 
Credits (looking to minimize risks in program lending), Country Financial 
Accountability Assessment (comparing local accounting and audit standards to 
international practice), and Country Procurement Assessment Report (sub-set of 
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